COMMENTS
Relation Back of Amendments Adding Plaintiffs Under
Rule 15(c)
Introduction
In 1998, Cary Cliff brought suit against OSI Collection Services, Inc., on
behalf of himself and other similarly situated Florida residents.1 After the
statute of limitations had run, Cliff filed an amendment, adding a
nationwide class of plaintiffs.2 Suddenly, OSI found itself facing a
potentially massive class action lawsuit and dramatically increased liability,
and the court was faced with the decision of whether to allow the class
complaint to relate back to the original time of filing for statute of
limitations purposes, or to declare that the nationwide plaintiffs were timebarred from bringing their action.3
When a complaint is amended to add new plaintiffs after the statute of
limitations has passed, allowing the amendment to relate back enables the
new plaintiff to circumvent the statute of limitations.4 As a result,
potentially massive class actions may be brought against defendants who
were not expecting to defend against such claims.
This comment examines the legal and policy concerns with allowing
amendments adding plaintiffs to relate back. Part I introduces the concepts
underlying the relation back doctrine by explaining that the policies behind
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure conflict with the policies underlying
statutes of limitations, and shows how Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(c) seeks to reconcile these policies. It also explains that because
amendments adding plaintiffs are not explicitly addressed in the rule, courts
must adapt the rule to apply to such amendments. Part II analyzes the three
different approaches courts have taken when determining whether to allow
relation back of amendments adding plaintiffs: (1) the literal Rule 15(c)
approach requiring mistake of identity; (2) the liberal approach focused on
the absence of prejudice; and (3) the approach requiring notice of the
1. Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1118-19 (11th Cir. 2004).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 1131-33.
4. Under the legal fiction of relation back, a court treats the untimely amendment as if
it had been included in the timely-filed original complaint. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere,
S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2010) (“[A]n amended pleading ‘relates back’ to the date of a
timely filed original pleading and is thus itself timely even though it was filed outside an
applicable statute of limitations.”).
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existence and involvement of new plaintiffs. Part III focuses on the
uncertainty surrounding this issue in the Tenth Circuit, surveying the
district court cases and suggesting what approach the Tenth Circuit is likely
to take if squarely confronted with the issue.
Parts IV and V explore some of the complexities of relation back of
amendments adding plaintiffs. Specifically, Part IV examines the potential
application of state relation back law in federal courts, and Part V discusses
the significant impact the relation back of plaintiffs can have in the class
action context and considers the implications of various approaches in class
action cases. Finally, Part VI proposes a standard for relation back of
amendments adding plaintiffs.
This comment maintains that in order to properly adapt Rule 15(c) to
amendments adding plaintiffs, courts should impose requirements that
respect the policies behind statutes of limitations. Thus, amendments
adding plaintiffs should only relate back narrowly, when the defendant had
notice that the plaintiff to be brought in by amendment previously asserted
or attempted to assert a claim in court during the limitations period.
Amendments adding plaintiffs should relate back only when (1) the original
plaintiff had the legal capacity to assert claims on behalf of the new
plaintiff, and (2) circumstances indicate that the new plaintiff intended to
assert those claims. This approach upholds the policies behind statutes of
limitations while furthering the principle that cases should be decided on
their merits.
I. Concepts Underlying Relation Back
Relation back doctrine embodies the interplay between two conflicting
policy choices: the policy behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the policies underlying statutes of limitations.5 This section establishes
several premises that are necessary to understand this policy conflict and
how the conflict applies to the relation back of amendments adding
plaintiffs. First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seek to promote
adjudication of conflicts on the merits. This policy requires that parties have
wide latitude to correct and clarify pleadings. Second, statutes of limitations
set a time period after which claims may not be brought, ensuring that
5. See id. at 2494 (“[T]he purpose of relation back [is] to balance the interests of the
defendant protected by the statute of limitations with the preference expressed in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in particular, for resolving disputes on their
merits.”); see also 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.15 (3d ed.
2011).
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lawsuits are brought in a timely manner and that defendants are not called
to defend themselves from stale claims. Third, Rule 15(c) attempts to
balance the conflicting policies, and the requirements it imposes restrict
relation back to those situations when the policies behind the statute of
limitations are not violated. Finally, because amendments adding plaintiffs
are not directly addressed in Rule 15(c), courts must apply the rule by
analogy. Because allowing untimely plaintiffs to join an action technically
violates the statute of limitations, amendments adding plaintiffs should only
relate back in narrow circumstances that respect the policies underlying the
statute of limitations.
A. Policies Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
One of the primary policies underlying the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is to facilitate the adjudication of conflicts on the merits.6 This
principle is particularly clear in the attitude the rules take to pleadings. The
rules “reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome.”7 Pleading is not an
end in itself, but is simply intended to facilitate the presentation of a case,
providing a defendant with “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.”8 Therefore, a party should not prevail
simply because the opponent’s pleading did not effectively state an
otherwise meritorious claim.9 As the Supreme Court noted in Foman v.
Davis, cases should not be dismissed “on the basis of such mere
technicalities.”10 Therefore, the rules allow parties to amend the pleadings,
instructing courts to give parties leave to amend whenever “justice so

6. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957), abrogated on other grounds by Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 47; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (summarizing pleading standards); 2
MOORE ET AL., supra note 5, § 8.10 (“[P]leadings should not be dismissed for technical
defects. The pleading should be construed as a whole, to determine whether adequate notice
of the claim or defense is presented.”).
9. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) (“It is . . . entirely contrary to the spirit of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of
such mere technicalities.”); Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48; see also Staren v. Am. Nat’l Bank &
Trust Co., 529 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1976) (“It is well settled that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are to be liberally construed to effectuate the general purpose of seeing that
cases are tried on the merits and to dispense with technical procedural problems.”).
10. 371 U.S. at 181.
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requires.”11 The liberal attitude the rules take toward allowing pleadings to
be amended is well-recognized.12
Parties often seek leave to amend pleadings after the statute of
limitations has run. Although claims or amendments made after the
limitations period has expired are presumed to be time-barred,13 a strict
application of this doctrine may yield unjust results where cases are decided
on the basis of inconsequential mistakes instead of on the merits.14 One oftcited example is Kerner v. Rackmill, a 1953 case in which the plaintiff
designated the defendant as an individual doing business as “Malibu Dude
Ranch” when the proper defendant was “Malibu Dude Ranch, Inc.,” a
corporation.15 An amendment was offered after the statute of limitations
had run to correct this error, but the court held that the amendment would
not relate back, even though the individual named in the complaint was an
agent authorized to receive service on behalf of the corporation.16 The
Kerner decision has been roundly criticized as contrary to the policy of
deciding claims on their merits, rather than on technicalities.17
Such decisions illustrate the need for some mechanism to amend
pleadings, even once the statute of limitations has run, in order to enable a
meritorious claim to go forward. Therefore, to allow pleadings to be
clarified and corrected, the rules allow an amendment to relate back to the
original date of filing when certain conditions are met.18 The original
version of Rule 15(c) allowed relation back when the claim asserted in the
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave [to amend] when
justice so requires.”).
12. See, e.g., Staren, 529 F.2d at 1263; Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 237
(5th Cir. 1968); Am. Fid. & Cas. Co. v. All Am. Bus Lines, Inc., 190 F.2d 234, 236 (10th
Cir. 1951).
13. Williams, 405 F.2d at 237 (“[T]he rule is generally stated to be that relation back
will not apply to an amendment that substitutes or adds a new party for those named initially
in the earlier timely pleadings. The reasoning apparently is that such an addition amounts to
the assertion of a ‘new cause of action,’ and if an amendment were allowed to relate back in
that situation, the purpose of the statute of limitations would be defeated.” (citation
omitted)).
14. See 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498
(3d ed. 2012).
15. 111 F. Supp. 150, 151 (M.D. Pa. 1953); see also 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14,
§ 1498 n.4; Lawrence A. Epter, An Un-Fortune-Ate Decision: The Aftermath of the Supreme
Court’s Eradication of the Relation-Back Doctrine, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 713, 720 (1990)
(discussing the Kerner decision).
16. Kerner, 111 F. Supp. at 151-52.
17. See, e.g., 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1498; Epter, supra note 15, at 720.
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).

2013]

COMMENTS

117

amendment arose out of the same transaction or occurrence stated in the
original pleading.19 Thus, parties were able to clarify the original claim,
expand or modify the facts alleged, increase the amount of relief sought,
and even assert new theories of recovery.20 This rule has been gradually
expanded, and the current version of Rule 15(c) allows amendments to
relate back to the original filing date in three circumstances.21 First, an
amendment may relate back if the applicable statute of limitations provides
for relation back.22 Second, an amendment may relate back under Rule
15(c)(1)(B) when it asserts a claim or defense that arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence as that stated in the original pleading.23 Third,
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) allows an amendment changing or adding defendants to
relate back under certain conditions.24 Although Rule 15(c) does not
explicitly provide for amendments adding new plaintiffs, the Advisory
Committee Notes suggest the rule may be applicable to amendments adding
plaintiffs as well, stating that the “attitude” toward changing defendants
“extends by analogy” to changing plaintiffs.25
B. Policies Underlying Statutes of Limitations
As the Supreme Court has observed, statutes of limitations “represent a
public policy about the privilege to litigate.”26 By barring claims after a
certain amount of time has passed, statutes of limitations compel plaintiffs
to file claims within a specified period.27 “They are by definition arbitrary,
and their operation does not discriminate between the just and the unjust
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (1938) (amended 1966, 1991, 1993).
20. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1497.
21. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).
22. Id. Rule 15(c)(1)(A).
23. Id. Rule 15(c)(1)(B).
24. Id. Rule 15(c)(1)(C) (“An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the
original pleading when: . . . the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party
against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period
provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by
amendment: (i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending
on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”).
25. Id. Rule 15(c) advisory committee’s note (1966) (“[T]he attitude taken in revised
Rule 15(c) toward change of defendants extends by analogy to amendments changing
plaintiffs.”).
26. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
27. Id. at 313 (considering whether a statute of limitations extinguishes the underlying
claim or merely the right to assert the claim in court); Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139
(1879) (“Mere delay, extending to the limit prescribed, is itself a conclusive bar.”).
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claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay.”28 They represent the notion
that “the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the
right to prosecute them.”29
Two policies underlie limitations statutes.30 First, statutes of limitations
are founded on the concept that “at some point, claims should be laid to rest
so that security and stability can be restored to human affairs.”31 The
uncertainty created by pending litigation prevents defendants from moving
forward and may “hinder the flow of commerce.”32 If potential defendants
are freed from the concern of perpetually unsettled claims, both individuals
and society are able to function more efficiently. Thus, one of the primary
purposes of statutes of limitations is to provide a measure of certainty and
repose for defendants.33 Second, the statutes relieve the court system of
stale claims34 and prevent prejudice to defendants by requiring that
plaintiffs bring actions before “evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”35 By enacting statutes of
28. Chase, 325 U.S. at 314.
29. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (quoting Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
30. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983); Burnett, 380
U.S. at 428; Wood, 101 U.S. at 139; see also Developments in the Law—Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185-86 (1950); Laurie Helzick, Note, Looking
Forward: A Fairer Application of the Relation Back Provisions of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c), 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 140-41 (1988).
31. Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1014 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Cunningham v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 530 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. 1987)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
32. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp., 710 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tex. 1986)
(“Society’s interest in repose is to have disputes either settled or barred within a reasonable
time. It is based on the theory that the uncertainty and insecurity caused by unsettled claims
hinder the flow of commerce.”); see Pappion v. Dow Chem. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1576, 1581
(W.D. La. 1986) (“[D]efendants can stop worrying about prospective claims and can
continue in the normal administration of their affairs.”); Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F. Supp. 516,
520 (D. Del. 1974) (stating that statutes of limitations ensure that “the defendant will be
protected from the insecurity generated by the fear of litigation pending in perpetuity,” and
“the marketplace will be free from the uncertainty of long pending and unsettled claims”);
see also Wood, 101 U.S. at 139.
33. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (“[Statutes of limitations] are
statutes of repose.”); see also Wood, 101 U.S. at 139 (“They promote repose by giving
security and stability to human affairs.”).
34. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (“[Statutes of limitations]
are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims . . . .”).
35. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974).
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limitations, legislatures recognize that it would be unjust to require a
defendant to defend such a claim.36
Statutes of limitations function by requiring plaintiffs to file timely suits
and by punishing delay.37 Thus, the statutes are undermined if late-coming
plaintiffs are given wide latitude to take advantage of the diligence of others
by joining existing actions.38 The Supreme Court has made clear that “a
plaintiff who ‘has slept on his rights’” should generally be barred from
asserting those rights once the limitations period has passed.39
C. Relation Back Rules Must Balance the Conflicting Policies
As the Supreme Court has stated, “the purpose behind relation back [is]
to balance the interests of the defendant protected by the statute of
limitations with the preference expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . for resolving disputes on their merits.”40 However, this
balance creates a tension between relation back and statutes of limitations.41
Because statutes of limitations prohibit bringing a claim after a certain
amount of time has passed, defendants may ordinarily assert a limitations
defense against an untimely amendment.42 Allowing an amendment to
relate back after the limitations period deprives the defendant of a

36. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (“Statutes of limitations . . . represent a pervasive
legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a
specified period of time . . . .”).
37. Wood, 101 U.S. at 139 (“[Statutes of limitations] stimulate to activity and punish
negligence.”).
38. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2002) (rejecting a liberal relation-back
rule and declaring that “[s]uch a rule would undermine applicable statutes of limitations and
make a mockery of the promise of repose”).
39. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 554 (quoting Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380
U.S. 424, 428 (1965)); see Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983)
(“Limitations periods are intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to
prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights . . . .”); Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428
(distinguishing a situation in which a plaintiff has slept on his rights and should be timebarred from situations in which the plaintiff should not be time-barred because he was
prevented from bringing his suit by fraud or war).
40. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010).
41. E.g., Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F. Supp. 516, 520 (D. Del. 1974) (“The problem is the
tension between the Rule 15 relation back provisions and the statute of limitations.”); see
also Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2494; Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1014 (3d Cir.
1995).
42. See, e.g., Sokolski v. Trans Union Corp., 178 F.R.D. 393, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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limitations defense and allows the plaintiff to assert a new claim even after
the statute of limitations has expired.43
However, the rules dictate that parties have wide latitude to correct and
clarify pleadings.44 Without relation back, an attempt to correct a good-faith
mistake or clarify a crucial point could be arbitrarily barred by a limitations
defense.45 As the Supreme Court noted in Kruspski v. Costa Crociere
S.p.A., while “[a] prospective defendant who legitimately believed that the
limitations period had passed without any attempt to sue him has a strong
interest in repose,” it would be unfair to allow a defendant to avoid liability
“only because the plaintiff misunderstood a crucial fact about [the
defendant’s] identity” during the limitations period.46 Thus, as Justice
Stevens observed, “[T]he principle purpose of Rule 15(c) is to enable a
plaintiff to correct a pleading error after the statute of limitations has run if
the correction will not prejudice his adversary in any way.”47 In other
words, relation back allows a party to amend a meritorious claim, so long as
the policies behind the statute of limitations are respected.48
As noted, the liberal approach of the rules allows wide latitude for
pleadings to be amended.49 However, in an effort to allow parties wide
latitude in amending their pleadings, some courts not only liberally allow
for amendments, but also seek to liberally allow amendments changing
parties to relate back to the original filing date when they would otherwise
be time-barred by the statute of limitations.50 While courts should liberally
allow amendments to be made to avoid adjudication based on technicalities,
amendments changing parties should relate back only in particular
circumstances. Rule 15(c) addresses this issue by allowing relation back
only when the policies behind the statute of limitations are not violated.51

43. Id.
44. See Andujar v. Rogowski, 113 F.R.D. 151, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[A]mendments as
a general matter are favored in order ‘to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.’” (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957))).
45. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2494.
46. Id.
47. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 38 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. E.g., Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F. Supp. 516, 520 (D. Del. 1974).
49. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
50. See Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
51. See, e.g., Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he rule strikes a
carefully calibrated balance.”); Yorden, 374 F. Supp. at 520 (“Rule 15 has been carefully
drafted to defer to the policies underlying such statutes.”).
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D. How Rule 15(c) Addresses Statute of Limitations Considerations
The rules distinguish between amendments adding new claims, which
are addressed in Rule 15(c)(1)(B), and amendments changing parties, which
are addressed by Rule 15(c)(1)(C).52 Prior to 1966, Rule 15(c) focused only
on amending claims and did not address amendments changing parties.53
However, some federal courts relied on the rule to allow amendments
pertaining to the parties to relate back to avoid injustice.54 Such situations
included the correction of misnomers55 and the addition of defendants who
had an identity of interest with the original defendant, and thus had
sufficient notice of the action prior to the running of the limitations
period.56 Other courts, however, adopted a strict interpretation of the rule
and refused to allow relation back of amendments changing parties, even to
correct the slightest mistakes.57 One recurrent problem was with individuals
who attempted to bring lawsuits against the federal government challenging
the denial of Social Security benefits, but failed to designate the proper
defendant: the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare.58 These plaintiffs were subsequently barred from correcting the
mistakes when they were discovered because the statute of limitations had
expired in the meantime.59 In direct response to these and similar cases, the
rule was amended in 1966 to specifically allow for the relation back of
amendments changing parties.60
Because the relation back of amendments changing claims and the
relation back of amendments changing parties are related, it is tempting to
apply the rationale behind the former to cases involving the latter.61
However, the two types of amendments are distinct, and each implicates
different statute of limitations considerations. A discussion of this
distinction is necessary to highlight the specific purpose each Rule
15(c)(1)(C) requirement serves.
52. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B), with id. Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
53. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1498.
54. Id.
55. Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3, 6-7 (5th Cir. 1958).
56. Meltzer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 25 F.R.D. 62, 65-66 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
57. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1498.
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee’s note (1966).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1968) (drawing on
cases involving amendments changing claims in determining whether to allow relation back
of amendment adding plaintiff).
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1. Rule 15(c)(1)(B)
When a plaintiff seeks to amend a complaint to modify the claim once
the limitations period has expired, notice is the primary consideration.62
This is because the pleading rules require only that a pleading put the
defendant on notice to prepare a defense.63 Pleadings are not required to
state specific legal theories or causes of action.64 Thus, amendments
asserting or clarifying transactionally related claims logically relate back to
the original filing date.65 “[S]o long as the different theories introduced by
the amendment fuse together within the ‘conduct, transaction, or
occurrence’ set forth in the complaint,”66 the newly asserted claims can be
considered encompassed by the original complaint, and the policy behind
the statute of limitations is satisfied.67
Therefore, Rule 15(c)(1)(B) allows an amendment to relate back if “the
amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the
original pleading.”68 By allowing a plaintiff to amend the complaint to
clarify the claim or modify the facts alleged, this rule ensures the pleading
is able to serve its purpose of bringing the “real issues of the case” before
the court.69
The requirement that the defendant had notice of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence underlying the claim is also sufficient to ensure
that the policies behind the statute of limitations are satisfied.70
By filing the original complaint, the plaintiff places the defendant on
notice that the plaintiff is trying to enforce a claim arising out of the alleged
62. Id.; accord Staren v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 529 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir.
1976).
63. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated on other grounds by Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
64. Id.
65. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1497 (“The fact that an amendment changes the
legal theory on which the action initially was brought is of no consequence if the factual
situation upon which the action depends remains the same and has been brought to
defendant’s attention by the original pleading.”).
66. Zagurski v. Am. Tobacco Co., 44 F.R.D. 440, 442 (D. Conn. 1967).
67. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922) (“The
amendment ‘merely expanded or amplified what was alleged in support of the cause of
action already asserted . . . and was not affected by the intervening lapse of time.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Renn, 241 U.S. 290, 293 (1916))).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
69. 2A MOORE ET AL., supra note 5, § 8.02.
70. Zagurski, 44 F.R.D. at 442-43.
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transaction, and therefore “[i]t is not unreasonable to require [the
defendant] to anticipate all theories of recovery and prepare its defense
accordingly.”71 Requiring notice in this way avoids prejudice to the
defendant. At the same time, the rule furthers the statute of limitations
policy of precluding claims by plaintiffs “who have sat on their rights,”72
because any claims allowed under the rule were encompassed by the
transactionally related facts in the original complaint.73
2. Rule 15(c)(1)(C)
While Rule 15(c)(1)(B) addresses amendments to claims, Rule
15(c)(1)(C) deals with changing parties.74 Specifically, the rule allows
amendments adding or changing defendants to relate back when certain
conditions are met.75 While the amendment must satisfy the 15(c)(1)(B)
requirement that it asserts a claim or defense arising out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out in the original pleading, Rule 15(c)(1)(C)
imposes two additional requirements.76 First, the new defendant must have
had “such notice [of the institution] of the action that [he] will not be
prejudiced in defending on the merits.”77 Second, the new defendant must
have known, or should have known, that he would have been named
originally if not for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party.78
By allowing misnomers and mistakes to be corrected, even once the
statute of limitations has run, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) ensures that meritorious
claims will not be dismissed on technical pleading errors.79 However, the
rule effectively addresses statute of limitations considerations as well, as
the two requirements it imposes for adding parties speak directly to the two
policies underlying statutes of limitations.80 Assuming the amendment
states a claim that is transactionally related to the pleading, Rule
15(c)(1)(C) allows relation back when: (1) notice was provided so as not to
prejudice the new party from defending on the merits, and (2) the new party

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 443.
See Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1995).
See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B), with id. Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
Id. Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 38 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1014 (3d Cir. 1995).
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“knew or should have known” that it would have been included initially, if
not for a mistake of identity.81
First, the two requirements of the rule ensure that the defendant has not
been prejudiced by the delay of an untimely claim.82 As the Northern
District of Illinois pointed out in Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, if the
new defendant “was aware all along that it would have been named in the
original complaint but for a mistake, then it is fair to say that the newly
added party had a real opportunity (and reason) to begin a defense even
though not originally named in the lawsuit.”83 When both requirements of
the rule are met, the newly added party has notice that a claim is being
asserted against it.
Second, the “mistake of identity” requirement in 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) protects
defendants’ interests in repose by ensuring that plaintiffs have not sat on
their rights.84 While the exact nature of what constitutes a “mistake” has
been a subject of much debate,85 the Supreme Court has directly stated that
the Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requirements are not met unless a mistake of identity
occurs.86 The mistake requirement limits the relation back of amendments
adding defendants to those cases where the plaintiff believed he or she had
filed a timely lawsuit against the proper party.87 Thus, the requirement
obliges plaintiffs to bring their suits in a timely fashion whenever they are
able, while preventing tardy plaintiffs from using relation back as an avenue
for springing untimely suits on unsuspecting defendants.88 As the First
Circuit noted, “[p]roperly construed, [Rule 15(c)(1)(C)] allows some claims
that otherwise might be dismissed on the basis of procedural technicalities

81. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C).
82. Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1014; see also Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F. Supp. 516, 520 (D. Del.
1974).
83. 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
84. Brever v. Federated Equity Mgmt. Co., 233 F.R.D. 429, 435 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (“The
requirement to demonstrate a mistake . . . is concerned with protecting a defendant’s interest
in repose where a dilatory complainant has simply sat on his or her rights . . . .”).
85. See, e.g., Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2492 & n.2 (2010)
(collecting cases summarizing the “tension among the Circuits” on the issue).
86. Id. at 2496 (stating that the Rule 15(c) requirements are not met when “the failure to
name the prospective defendant in the original complaint was the result of a fully informed
decision as opposed to a mistake concerning the proper defendant’s identity”); see also
Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 467 n.1 (2000).
87. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2494.
88. See Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1995).

2013]

COMMENTS

125

to prosper while at the same time keeping the door closed to other claims
that have been allowed to wither on the vine.”89
E. Applying Relation Back to Amendments Adding Plaintiffs
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) does not expressly cover amendments adding plaintiffs.
The text of the rule refers only to amendments changing “the party against
whom a claim is asserted”—that is, defendants.90 However, the
accompanying Advisory Committee Notes state that “the attitude taken in
revised Rule 15(c) toward change of defendants extends by analogy to
amendments changing plaintiffs.”91 Therefore, most courts have approached
this problem by attempting to ascertain in what form the rule should be
applied to plaintiffs.92
The “attitude” taken in Rule 15(c) is a nuanced approach that carefully
balances the conflicting policies behind the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure with the policies behind statutes of limitations.93 The rule not
only avoids prejudice to defendants, it also protects defendants’ “strong
interest in repose” except in cases where defendants are aware they have
avoided liability only because of a mistake.94 More fundamentally, by
imposing the mistake requirement, the rule respects statutes of limitations
by limiting relation back to those cases where the plaintiff did not sit on his
rights, but legitimately asserted or attempted to assert the claim in the
original complaint.95 Thus, a truly effective application of the rule to
plaintiffs will not focus merely on prejudice to the defendant. It will also
impose some standard to restrict relation back to those instances where the
plaintiff to be brought in by amendment asserted or attempted to assert a
claim in the original complaint.
Three primary approaches have developed among the federal circuits
regarding how to apply the “attitude” of Rule 15(c) to amendments seeking
89.
90.
91.
92.

Young v. Lepone, 305 F. 3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2002).
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note (1966).
See 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND
COMMENTARY, 315 nn.178-81 (2012) (collecting cases). But see Newell v. Harrison, 779 F.
Supp. 388, 392 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding that the plain language of Rule 15(c) does not apply
to amendments changing or adding plaintiffs).
93. Young, 305 F.3d at 14; Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F. Supp. 516, 520 (D. Del. 1974).
94. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010); Powers v. Graff,
148 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Wells v. HBO & Co., 813 F. Supp. 1561, 1567
(N.D. Ga. 1992)).
95. Wells, 813 F. Supp. at 1566 (“Rule 15(c) serves to ensure that amendments relate
back only if the original pleading gave adequate notice of the subject of the amendment.”).
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to add untimely plaintiffs.96 This comment examines the legal and policy
ramifications of each of these approaches, determining how well each
balances the conflicting policies underlying relation back.
II. The Three Approaches Taken by Courts
A. The Literal Approach Requiring Mistake of Identity
Some courts have adopted a “literal approach” that applies all the literal
requirements of Rule 15(c) to plaintiffs.97 Rule 15(c)(1) states:
An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the
original pleading when:
A. the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations
allows relation back;
B. the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or
attempted to be set out—in the original pleading; or
C. the amendment changes the party or the naming of the
party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule
15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided
by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint,
the party to be brought in by amendment:
i.

received such notice of the action that it will not
be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and

ii.

knew or should have known that the action would
have been brought against it, but for a mistake
concerning the proper party’s identity.98

Courts using this approach consider the threshold issue of whether the
new claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the
original claim.99 Then, as the text of Rule 15(c) prohibits the addition of
new parties unless there was a mistake concerning their identities,100 the
plaintiff must show that the defendants knew or should have known that
96.
2005).
97.
98.
99.
100.

See Plummer v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315-16 (E.D. Okla.
Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036 , 1042 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1).
See Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1995).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C).
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“but for a mistake, they would have been sued directly by these
plaintiffs.”101 The mistake requirement makes this approach quite
restrictive.
The Third Circuit articulated this approach in Nelson v. County of
Allegheny.102 In Nelson, a group of women had been arrested during a
protest and subsequently filed a suit alleging civil rights violations.103 More
than two years after the statute of limitations had run, an amended
complaint attempted to add two additional protestors as party plaintiffs.104
The court stated that “for the [plaintiffs’] claims to relate back, all three
conditions specified in Rule 15(c)(3) must be satisfied.”105 Because the new
plaintiffs’ allegations were transactionally related to the original pleading
and the evidence overlapped, there was no prejudice to the defendant.106
However, the court went on to hold that the amendment did not relate back
because the plaintiffs did “not demonstrate[] ‘a mistake concerning the
identity of the proper party.’”107 Rather, the plaintiffs “sat on their rights”
and then “[sought] to take advantage of the rule to perform an end-run
around the statute of limitations.”108 The court recognized that the mistake
requirement places appropriate limits on relation back and screens out such
late-coming plaintiffs by “requir[ing] plaintiffs to show that the already
commenced action sufficiently embraces the amended claims so that
defendants are not unfairly prejudiced by these late-coming plaintiffs and
that plaintiffs have not slept on their rights.”109 Thus, the court determined
that to respect the statute of limitations, it must apply the relation back rule
as written.110 Courts in the Third Circuit have embraced this approach,111
while other courts have at least considered lack of mistake as a factor in
declining to allow relation back.112
101. Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1015.
102. See id. at 1011-15.
103. Id. at 1011.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1014.
106. Id. at 1015.
107. Id. at 1014 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)).
108. Id. at 1015.
109. Id. at 1014.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Brever v. Federated Equity Mgmt. Co., 233 F.R.D. 429, 435 (W.D. Pa.
2005).
112. See, e.g., Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d 313, 319 (6th Cir.
2010) (holding plaintiffs were not attempting to correct a misnomer or substitute the real
party in interest, but instead were “attempt[ing] to circumvent the statute of limitations,
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Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a “mistake of identity” limits the
addition of new parties to those situations where there is a valid pleading
error, ensuring that tardy plaintiffs are not able to use relation back rules to
join a lawsuit when there is no legitimate pleading error to correct.113 If an
error has been made in the naming of one of the plaintiffs, the statute of
limitations will not bar a plaintiff from correcting this error. However, one
problem with applying the literal text to plaintiffs is that it is difficult to
conceive of a situation in which the plaintiff was mistaken about its own
identity. The most likely situation to arise is one in which the plaintiff was
actually mistaken about his or her right to bring the suit. For example, one
subsidiary corporation might bring a lawsuit when technically the right to
bring the suit belonged to a parent corporation or a sister subsidiary.
In Gardner v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the Third Circuit held
that such a case would be more appropriately dealt with under Rule 17,
which allows for the joinder of the real party in interest.114 Rule 17 states
that “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest”115 and allows the real party in interest an opportunity “to ratify,
join or be substituted in the action.”116 Thus, when there was a mistake
about who had the right to bring the lawsuit, Rule 17 allows plaintiffs to
join a suit after the limitations period has passed.117 Therefore, applying
Rule 15(c) to amendments adding plaintiffs is redundant if showing a
“mistake of identity” would only apply to situations where the real party in
interest is being substituted in the case. Such cases would indeed be more
appropriately dealt with under Rule 17.
However, Rule 17 may not be sufficiently broad to render Rule 15(c)
useless as applied to all plaintiffs. For instance, if the original plaintiff in
the suit is a real party in interest, Rule 17 will not allow for the addition of
adding new parties and new claims”); Makro Capital of Am., Inc. v. UBS AG, 543 F.3d
1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (requiring mistake concerning identity of proper plaintiff).
113. Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1015; see also 1 GENSLER, supra note 92, at 315 (“Faithfully
policing these requirements ensures that dilatory plaintiffs are not able to evade limitations
periods by the expedient of joining with timely claimants and then seeking relation back.”).
114. 544 F.3d 553, 562 (3d Cir. 2008). In Gardner, the Third Circuit refused to apply
relation back to an amendment seeking to add a plaintiff, pointing out that the rule text
applies to defendants, and that the rule “extend[ed] [only] by analogy to . . . plaintiffs.” Id. at
561-62 (second alteration in original). Instead, the court declared that Rule 17 was “more
applicable,” and then refused to allow relation back under that theory. Id. at 562.
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1).
116. Gardner, 544 F.3d at 562.
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(3) (“After ratification, joinder, or substitution, the action
proceeds as if it had been originally commenced by the real party in interest.”).
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other plaintiffs. The Advisory Committee Note discussing relation back of
amendments adding plaintiffs mentions that Rule 17 is also relevant, but
primarily directs courts toward Rule 15(c)(1)(C) for guidance.118 Therefore,
there may be other scenarios where justice would require an untimely
plaintiff other than the real party in interest to be added as a plaintiff under
Rule 15(c). If so, we must determine how to adapt the careful requirements
of Rule 15(c) to plaintiffs to reach a functionally similar result.
B. The Liberal Notice-Based Approach
Recognizing that “mechanically applying the mistake requirement to the
addition of a new plaintiff would make little sense,” other courts have
abandoned the literal text of the rule in favor of a notice-based approach.119
Courts taking this approach reason that the policies behind statutes of
limitations are upheld if the addition of the new plaintiff does not prejudice
the defendant.120 Therefore, when applying Rule 15(c) to plaintiffs, these
courts allow relation back if the complaint provided the defendant with
notice sufficient to avoid prejudice.121 While some courts require a shared
identity of interest between the old and new plaintiffs to establish sufficient
notice, other courts consider the standard to be met any time the claims of
the old and new plaintiffs arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or
occurrence.
1. Identity of Interest to Avoid Prejudice
In Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, the Northern District of Illinois
rejected a literal application of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) to amendments adding
plaintiffs.122 The court reasoned that because the rule was intended to
govern amendments adding defendants, its requirements must be adapted in
order to meaningfully apply the rule to amendments adding plaintiffs.123 To
this end, the court examined the rule, noting that the mistake requirement
“helps ensure that the newly added party—who was not originally a
defendant in the case—in fact had timely notice that it was the real target of
the allegations.”124 The court reasoned that when applying the rule to
plaintiffs, the analogous concern was ensuring that the defendant was aware
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee’s note (1966).
See Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
See, e.g., id. at 1041-44.
See id. at 1045.
Id. at 1043.
Id. at 1041-42.
Id. at 1043.
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of “the possibility that other plaintiffs might assert claims arising from
the . . . conduct” described in the original pleading.125 Thus, the court
focused on determining whether the defendant had fair “notice that it might
have to defend a claim brought by the new plaintiff,” and whether the
defendant suffered any actual prejudice, such as the loss of evidence due to
the passage of time.126 In addition to requiring that the new “claim [arose]
out of the same transaction, conduct or occurrence alleged in the original
complaint,” the court also considered whether an identity of interest existed
between the two plaintiffs, “so close that a court can conclude that a
defendant had notice of a new party’s potential claims and thus would not
suffer any prejudice by the party’s addition.”127
The Seventh Circuit used a similar analysis in Staren v. American
National Bank & Trust Co., allowing a corporation to be substituted as
plaintiff, where the original plaintiffs were the individual owners of the
corporation.128 The court focused primarily on the fact that the claims
asserted by the parties were transactionally related, stating that “[t]he
emphasis is to be placed on the determination of whether the amended
complaint arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.”129 The court went on to
observe that because the substituted and original plaintiffs had an identity
of interest, the defendant had such notice that no prejudice would result.130
This approach is founded on the premise “that notice is the critical
element involved in Rule 15(c) determinations.”131 However, courts taking
this position fail to recognize that an absence of prejudice only partially
satisfies the statute of limitations policies.132 Even when a defendant is
aware of the potential claims that other plaintiffs might assert, once the
limitations period has passed without an actual lawsuit being asserted, the

125. Id. at 1043-44.
126. Id. at 1045.
127. Id.
128. 529 F.2d 1257, 1259, 1263 (7th Cir. 1976).
129. Id. at 1263.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Powers v. Graff, 148 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 1998) (“‘A potential defendant
who has not been named in a lawsuit by the time the statute of limitations has run is entitled
to repose . . . .’” (quoting Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1997)));
Wells v. HBO & Co., 813 F. Supp. 1561, 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (“Rule 15(c) plainly
provides that potential defendants are entitled to repose after a certain period unless they
know they have escaped suit only by mistake.”).
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defendant is entitled to repose.133 Thus, to ensure that the defendant is not
being deprived of repose simply because a plaintiff has sat on his rights,
relation back must be limited to exclude such late-coming plaintiffs.134
When considering amendments that add new plaintiffs, courts cannot
properly declare that notice is the only critical element to be considered.135
Rather, a court should consider whether invoking the statute of limitations
would unjustly prevent a party who had attempted to assert a claim from
asserting it, or whether the statue is being properly used to prevent an
untimely plaintiff from joining an action.136 Other courts have flatly
rejected the notion that transactional relatedness combined with notice is
sufficient to satisfy the statute of limitations.137
In Olech, the court attempted to explain the rationale of the notice-based
approach, first noting “that when the question is adding a party plaintiff
rather than a party defendant, it is not the explicit requirements of Rule
15(c) that govern but rather the ‘attitude’ of Rule 15(c).”138 The court,
however, went on to proclaim that “the attitude that animates the rule is to
liberally permit amendment of pleadings in order to facilitate decisions on
the merits, so long as that can be done without sacrificing ‘essential
fairness’ to defendants.”139 In so doing, the court wrongly identified the
attitude of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). While the rules generally do liberally permit
133. Wells, 813 F. Supp. at 1567.
134. See Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1968) (“[W]hen it comes
to a late effort to introduce a new party, something else is added. Not only must the
adversary have had notice about the operational facts, but it must have had fair notice that a
legal claim existed in and was in effect being asserted by, the party belatedly brought in.”).
135. It has become axiomatic that notice is the primary consideration in Rule 15(c)(1)(B)
determinations. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Thus, some courts recite the
principle in Rule 15(c)(1)(C) cases as well, failing to recognize the distinctions between the
respective rules. See, e.g., Williams, 405 F. 2d at 238 (“Clearly notice is the critical element
involved in Rule 15(c) determinations.”).
136. See Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 511 (D.D.C. 1990) (“‘In
deciding whether an amendment relates back to the original claim, notice to the opposing
party of the existence and involvement of the new plaintiff is the critical element.’” (quoting
Avila v. INS, 731 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 1984))).
137. See, e.g., Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2002); Pappion v. Dow
Chem. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1576, 1581-82 (W.D. La. 1986) (“The policy for statutes of
limitations would be circumvented if a plaintiff is allowed to amend his complaint and add a
new plaintiff merely because the new plaintiff’s claim arose from the same transaction or
occurrence of the original claim and the defendant was aware that the new plaintiff
existed.”).
138. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
139. Id.
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amendments, the attitude taken toward relation back of amendments
changing defendants is a restrained approach that respects statutes of
limitations by limiting relation back to situations where it is necessary to
correct a mistake by the plaintiff.140 An application of the rule to plaintiffs
requires similar restraint. Otherwise, late-coming plaintiffs are able to take
advantage of relation back simply to circumvent the statute of limitations,
and, as a result, defendants are denied both the use of the limitations
defense and their interest in repose.141
2. The Transactional Test
Evolving Seventh Circuit jurisprudence has imposed few restrictions on
relation back of amendments adding new plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit
allows claims by new plaintiffs to relate back as long as they are
transactionally related to the claim set out in the pleading.142 This broad and
permissive approach could allow an individual claim to become a class
action by amendment long after the statute of limitations has run.
In Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co., the Seventh Circuit affirmed a lower
court ruling allowing an amendment adding class plaintiffs in a Title VII
case to relate back to a filing by a similarly situated individual.143 In
determining the proper requirements for relation back of such amendments,
the trial court addressed only the issue of prejudice, completely ignoring the
other considerations involved in statutes of limitations.144 While the trial
court “note[d] that it is rare that an amendment will relate back which adds
plaintiffs who are total strangers to the lawsuit,” the court did not impose
any standard to promote this principle, such as requiring some degree of
privity between the original and additional plaintiffs.145 The court only
required the plaintiff to show that the defendant had not been prejudiced by
lack of notice.146 Because “Title VII is primarily designed to eradicate
discrimination of a class-wide character,” the trial court concluded that the
filing of a Title VII complaint was sufficient to place the defendant on
140. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010); see also supra Part
I.D.
141. See Brever v. Federated Equity Mgmt. Co., 233 F.R.D. 429, 435 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
142. See Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008).
143. 646 F.2d 1210, 1211 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
144. See Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co., 494 F. Supp. 687, 689 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (“The
primary purpose of statutes of limitation is to protect parties from the prejudice caused by
the loss of evidence due to the passage of time.”), aff’d, 646 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam).
145. Id.
146. See id.
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notice of “class-based” claims.147 Furthermore, because the claims involved
the same evidence, the defendant was not prejudiced by loss of evidence.148
Thus, the amendment was allowed to relate back.149 In a per curiam
opinion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating
simply that relation back was proper because the class claims arose from
the same practices as the plaintiff’s original, individual claim.150
In Arreola v. Godinez, the Seventh Circuit went even further, explicitly
holding that amendments adding new plaintiffs relate back as long as the
claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence set out in the original
pleading.151 Rule 15(c)(1)(B) provides that an amended pleading relates
back when “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in
the original pleading.”152 This rule is usually understood to allow
amendments to add new claims or defenses that are transactionally related
to that in the original pleading, or to assert new legal theories.153 However,
the Seventh Circuit held that because the amendment adding new plaintiffs
included a claim that was transactionally related to the original pleading,
Rule 15(c)(1)(B) would govern, and would allow relation back.154 In a
cursory analysis, the court noted that because the amendment did not seek
to add a new defendant, “there [was] no problem under Rule
15(c)(1)(C).”155
Such a reading of Rule 15(c)(1)(B) would apparently allow for any
changes to the pleading, so long as the amendment also asserts a claim
transactionally related to the original pleading. However, this cannot be the
intended reading of the rule. If it were, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) would be
unnecessary, as the changes it authorizes would be allowed under Rule
15(c)(1)(B).156 Furthermore, the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966
amendment specify that “the attitude . . . toward change of defendants
extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs,” clearly directing
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 690.
150. Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 1210, 1211 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
151. 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008).
152. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
153. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 516
(6th Cir. 2007).
154. Arreola, 546 F.3d at 796.
155. Id.
156. One of the requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is “if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C).
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courts toward Rule 15(c)(1)(C).157 The Seventh Circuit application of Rule
15(c)(1)(B) to this issue leaves the door open for any number of plaintiffs
who are strangers to a case to join pending actions long after the statute of
limitations has passed. Other courts have “flatly reject[ed] the proposition
that relation back is available merely because a new plaintiff’s claims arise
from the same transaction or occurrence as the original plaintiff’s
claims.”158 The First Circuit aptly points out that an action filed by one
plaintiff does not give “a defendant notice of the impending joinder of any
or all similarly situated plaintiffs.”159
The Seventh Circuit’s relation back doctrine is grounded on the faulty
logic that because courts are encouraged to liberally allow parties to amend
their pleadings, those amendments should also relate back liberally. The
court does not consider that the expansive use of relation back rules for
amendments adding time-barred plaintiffs is contrary to the underlying
purpose of the rules—the adjudication of conflicts on their merits. Relation
back generally promotes that goal, preventing the dismissal of meritorious
claims on technicalities by allowing for the correction of inconsequential
pleading errors.160 However, by liberally construing relation back, the
Seventh Circuit allows unmeritorious (time-barred) claims to be added on a
technicality. To best promote adjudication of conflicts on their merits,
claims adding parties should relate back only under the narrow
circumstances contemplated in Rule 15(c)(1)(C): when a party seeks to
clarify a pleading by adding another person or entity who is clearly
implicated in the lawsuit, but would otherwise be barred from making the
correction by the statute of limitations.
C. The Involvement Approach
1. Application of the Involvement Standard
Recognizing both the importance of limiting potential plaintiffs and the
problems with applying the mistake of identity requirement to plaintiffs,
some courts have forged a third approach.161 This approach rejects the
notion that the mere absence of prejudice is sufficient to uphold the policies
157. Id. Rule 15(c) advisory committee’s note (1966).
158. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2002).
159. Id. at 15.
160. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010).
161. See, e.g., Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Plummer v. Farmers
Grp., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315 (E.D. Okla. 2005) (discussing the literal and noticebased approaches and noting the limitations of each).
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behind the statute of limitations.162 Instead, it requires that defendants have
notice not only of the existence of potential plaintiffs, but also of their
involvement in the litigation.163 Courts have generally recognized notice of
the new plaintiff’s involvement when an identity of interest exists between
the original and the new plaintiffs, or when the defendant knew or should
have known that other plaintiffs were attempting to assert claims.164 If
applied properly, this approach has the advantage of limiting relation back
to those situations where the new plaintiff was asserting or attempting to
assert the claims in the original complaint.
The Fifth Circuit formulated this approach in Williams v. United States,
one of the first cases to test the application of the 1966 amendment to Rule
15(c) to plaintiffs.165 In Williams, a mother had asserted a claim as next
friend of her injured minor child.166 After the statute of limitations had run,
the mother sought to amend the complaint to add herself as a party plaintiff
and recover for loss of services, as allowed by state law.167 The court
recognized that relation back of amendments adding parties demands
special consideration of the purpose behind the statute of limitations, noting
that the analysis must go beyond a mere question of notice.168 Conceding
that “notice is the critical element” in determining whether a claim should
relate back, the court observed that when considering the relation back of
amendments adding plaintiffs, “something else is added.”169 “Not only must
the adversary have had notice about the operational facts, but it must have
had fair notice that a legal claim existed in and was in effect being asserted
by, the party belatedly brought in.”170 The court held that a liberal reading
of the complaint “clearly revealed the existence of (a) a minor (b) the

162. See, e.g., Leachman, 694 F.2d at 1309 (“Even if, as here, there were no showing of
specific prejudice in the sense of lost or destroyed evidence, defendants would still be
deprived of their interest in repose.”).
163. Id.
164. See infra notes 165-88 and accompanying text.
165. 405 F.2d at 236-39.
166. Id. at 235. A “next friend” is “[a] person who appears in a lawsuit to act for the
benefit of an incompetent or minor plaintiff, but who is not a party to the lawsuit and is not
appointed as a guardian.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (9th ed. 2009).
167. Williams, 405 F.2d at 235.
168. Id. at 237 (“[S]uch an addition amounts to the assertion of a ‘new cause of action,’
and if an amendment were allowed to relate back in that situation, the purpose of the statute
of limitation would be defeated.”).
169. Id. at 236, 238.
170. Id. at 238.

136

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:113

mother as parent and (c) the assertion by her of a claim.”171 The defendant
knew of her involvement in the case as the child’s next friend, and therefore
an amendment allowing her to assert a claim in her own right was allowed
to relate back.172 The plaintiff’s amendment in Williams has been
characterized as “merely a change in capacity,” where “the defendant must
have known of the existence of the plaintiff’s other capacity.”173 This
approach to Rule 15(c) allows relation back for plaintiffs who were actually
involved in the case, albeit informally, while prohibiting the addition of
strangers who could have been involved but instead sat on their rights.
The D.C. Circuit applied this standard in Leachman v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., refusing to allow relation back for a corporation wholly owned by an
existing plaintiff.174 Considering how to adapt Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s mistake
of identity requirement to a situation involving additional plaintiffs, the
court reasoned that “[t]he touchstone . . . is whether the defendant knew or
should have known of the existence and involvement of the new
plaintiff.”175 In adopting this standard, the court emphasized the need for
limits to prevent “total strangers” from joining actions, “caus[ing]
defendants’ liability to increase geometrically and their defensive strategy
to become far more complex long after the statute of limitations had run.”176
The court reasoned that even if the defendant had known of the plaintiff’s
ownership of the corporation, it would not have known of the corporation’s
potential involvement in the case.177 Thus, the corporation’s claim against
the defendant “was simply a new cause of action” brought by an untimely
claimant.178 Therefore, although “there [was] no showing of specific
prejudice in the sense of lost or destroyed evidence,” the court refused to
allow relation back.179
171. Id. at 239 (“Since liability to the minor would give rise to a liability to the parent
under local law, and since the circumstances of these individuals was such as would
reasonably indicate a likelihood that the parent would incur losses of a recoverable kind, the
Government was put on notice that the parent’s claim was also involved.” (footnote
omitted)). The Williams court noted that the outcome “might have been different if the next
friend . . . had been a nonrelated person, such as a corporate fiduciary.” Id. at 239 n.13.
172. Id. at 239.
173. Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(discussing Williams, 405 F.2d 234).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1310.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1309-10.
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This application of identity of interest permits relation back of new
plaintiffs under a much narrower set of circumstances than the Olech
standard.180 Under Leachman, an amendment relates back when the “new”
plaintiff had actually been involved in the suit “from an early stage.”181
However, under Olech, an amendment relates back when the defendant had
notice even of the new party’s potential claims.182
As an individual complaint probably does not place a potential defendant
on notice of the actual assertion of class-wide claims or the actual
involvement of members of a putative class, amendments adding class
plaintiffs are not likely to relate back under the Leachman approach. The
Western District of Michigan held that an individual complaint did not
“place[] [the] defendant on notice that it could be called to answer for the
extensive class allegations in the amended pleading.”183 Likewise, the Sixth
Circuit, applying the Tennessee state law identity of interest standard, found
no identity of interest when the original complaint and the amended classwide allegations were identical.184
Identity of interest may not be the only way to establish notice of
involvement. Some courts have also recognized such notice where “the
original complaint on its face reveals the existence of additional claimants,”
which, “possibly in combination with some conduct by plaintiffs or the
defendant, justifies an inference that the new claimants were in fact
‘involved’ in the action.”185 For example, in Sokolski v. Trans Union Corp.,
the original complaint made clear that the plaintiff intended “to name and
certify a class action within 60 days before trial.”186 The court allowed
relation back on the theory that the timely-filed “complaint provided the
defendants with adequate notice that a class action was contemplated and
180. Compare id., with Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (N.D.
Ill. 2000).
181. Leachman, 694 F.2d at 1309 (quoting 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 15.15 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Olech, 138 F. Supp. 2d. at 1045.
183. Peralta v. Accept Acceptance, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-1270, 2009 WL 723910, at *4
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 10, 2009).
184. Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 405-06 (6th Cir. 2007).
185. Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 512 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing
Andujar v. Rogowski, 113 F.R.D. 151, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)); see also Sokolski v. Trans
Union Corp., 178 F.R.D. 393, 398-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (allowing relation back of
amendment adding class plaintiffs where original complaint requested that plaintiff be
granted leave to amend and certify a class action, and alleged that the defendant intended “to
deceive plaintiff and ‘others’”).
186. 178 F.R.D. at 398.
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would be sought.”187 Likewise, in Soler v. G & U, Inc., the Southern
District of New York found that notice of involvement was satisfied when
language in the complaint explicitly referred to new plaintiffs, combined
with the fact that the prospective plaintiffs had filed consent to sue forms.188
2. Potential Misapplication of the Notice of Involvement Standard
To uphold the statute of limitations policies, the notice of involvement
standard must be applied properly. However, three particular areas pose a
risk for misapplication of the standard. One danger is that courts will
consider references to the existence of the potential plaintiffs in the
complaint sufficient to satisfy the requirements of dual notice, when such
references clearly do not accomplish this goal.189 Page v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. illustrates the care courts must take in separating the actual
involvement of potential plaintiffs from obvious references to their
existence in the complaint.190 In Page, an individual plaintiff alleged that
the defendant “fail[ed] to guarantee and pay benefits to her and other
members of her pension plan.”191 The complaint made references to
“‘plaintiff and other members of the class’” and “‘other individuals
similarly situated.’”192 The plaintiff later sought to add as plaintiffs “a
proposed nationwide class of indeterminate size,” arguing that the
complaint was, on its face, “an obvious omnibus challenge on behalf of
every allegedly wronged pensioner.”193 The court rejected this argument,
holding that even these explicit references to the potential class were not
sufficient to provide notice of the class members’ involvement in the
case.194 The court emphasized that to allow such statements to satisfy the
requirement would effectively reduce the standard to a transactional test.195
187. Id. at 398-99.
188. 103 F.R.D. 69, 74-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
189. See Page, 130 F.R.D. at 511-12 (holding that references in the complaint to “‘other
individuals similarly situated’” did not provide notice of those individuals’ involvement).
190. See id. at 512-13.
191. Id. at 511.
192. Id. at 511-12.
193. Id. at 511, 513.
194. Id. at 513 (“The Court rejects the idea, advanced by plaintiff, that a declaratory
judgment action by a limited group necessarily puts a defendant on notice that it may be
engaged in litigation with nationwide implications.”).
195. Id. (characterizing plaintiff’s argument as “another way of saying that where a new
plaintiff’s claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence, and nothing more, relation
back should obtain”). The Page court went on to allow a limited class of plaintiffs to relate
back on other grounds. Id.
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Thus, a reference in the complaint to other parties who may have potential
claims is insufficient to establish their involvement in the case.196 One
possible exception may be when the original plaintiff has the capacity to
sue on behalf of the new plaintiff. For example, as determined in Williams
v. United States, when claims are asserted by a parent or guardian on behalf
of a minor child, the defendant would be aware of the individual claims of
the parent or guardian arising from the same transaction.197
To understand how “capacity to sue” can play a critical role, contrast
Williams with LeMasters v. K-Mart, Inc., a case which appears to contain
similar facts but where the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue on behalf of the
new plaintiff.198 In LeMasters, the plaintiff’s wife had witnessed the
accident that gave rise to the plaintiff’s injury claim.199 The defendant had
notice of these facts “minutes after the accident,” as evidenced by the
accident report.200 Seeking to amend the complaint to add the wife as a
plaintiff claiming loss of consortium, the plaintiff argued that, under
Williams, the amendment should relate back because it was clear that the
plaintiff had a wife, and that the defendant was on notice that she had a
potential claim for loss of consortium.201 However, the court refused to
allow relation back, reasoning that the fact that the plaintiff had a wife did
not imply that she had a claim for loss of consortium.202
In Williams, the mother was in a unique situation because she had the
capacity to assert claims both in her own right and as her child’s next
friend.203 Although she first brought the lawsuit on behalf of the child, the
defendant was aware of her “involvement” in the case, as well as her
existence.204 In LeMasters, on the other hand, the plaintiff had no capacity
to assert a claim on behalf of his wife.205 Absent some affirmative action by
the wife to show her involvement in the case, the defendant had no reason
to suspect that she was or would be asserting claims.206

196.
197.
198.
1989).
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See id. at 511-12.
See Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1968).
Compare id., with LeMasters v. K-Mart, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 518, 520-21 (E.D. La.
LeMasters, 712 F. Supp. at 520.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Williams, 405 F.2d at 235.
Id. at 239.
LeMasters, 712 F. Supp. at 520.
Id.
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A second danger of misapplication is in the way courts interpret the new
plaintiff’s involvement. For example, in Andujar v. Rogowski, four
individuals initiated a lawsuit, filing a complaint that described an incident
involving “‘plaintiffs, along with other workers.’”207 An amendment adding
three additional individuals was allowed to relate back based primarily on
the fact that one of the defendants had “participated in settlement
negotiations that involved demands made on behalf of [the new
plaintiffs].”208 The court reasoned that those demands, combined with the
statements in the complaint, placed the defendants on actual notice “of the
existence of other potential claims outstanding.”209
The danger here lies in the fact that settlement negotiations with a
potential plaintiff place a defendant only on notice that a claim exists, not
that such a claim will necessarily be asserted. Under ordinary
circumstances, a plaintiff must file a lawsuit within the limitations period.
The fact that the parties engaged in settlement negotiations prior to the
running of the limitations period does not allow a tardy would-be plaintiff
to escape the limitations bar.210 As the Sixth Circuit has observed, “a
defendant does not waive a statute of limitations defense merely by
engaging in settlement negotiations with a plaintiff.”211 Likewise, when one
plaintiff has filed a suit, the fact that a defendant engages in settlement
negotiations with a second potential plaintiff should not waive the
defendant’s limitations defense as to the second plaintiff. Absent an express
reference to the imminent addition of new plaintiffs in the complaint,
settlement negotiations give no indication that a party to the negotiations
was attempting to assert a legal claim in a pending lawsuit.212
Again, a possible exception could be when the original plaintiff has the
capacity to assert claims on behalf of the new plaintiff. For example, if a
trustee asserts a claim arising out of a conduct, transaction, or occurrence
that would also give rise to a claim by the trustee’s beneficiary, and in
settlement negotiations the trustee makes demands on behalf of the
207. 113 F.R.D. 151, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Michals v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 289 F.3d 402, 409 (6th Cir. 2002); see also
Simpson v. Jack Baker, Inc., 620 A.2d 254, 255 (D.C. 1993) (per curiam) (declining to toll
the statute of limitations where plaintiff, “in hopes of settlement, . . . failed to file suit prior
to the expiration of the statute of limitations”).
211. Michals, 289 F.3d at 409.
212. See Raziano v. United States, 999 F.2d 1539, 1541 (11th Cir. 1993) (declining to
toll the statute of limitations where settlement negotiations placed the defendant on notice
that the claim might be pursued in court).
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beneficiary, it is possible that the defendant is on notice that the trustee is
attempting to assert a claim on behalf of the beneficiary. Under this
analysis, settlement negotiations undertaken on behalf of a class would
constitute “involvement” of the class only when the class had been
certified, giving the negotiator capacity to assert claims on behalf of the
new class plaintiffs.213
A third potential for misapplication arises from confusion created by
courts purporting to apply an “identity of interest” test. While some courts
following the Leachman and Williams approach apply an “identity of
interest” test as a standard for determining when a defendant should have
had notice of a potential plaintiff’s involvement,214 the term is problematic
because of its widespread use in other contexts. To satisfy the “existence
and involvement” requirement articulated in Williams, courts usually
require a “legal or familial relationship” to establish identity of interest.215
However, courts applying a liberal approach focused on notice use an
“identity of interest” test to determine whether the defendant had notice
sufficient to avoid prejudice.216 Under this much broader standard, even a
putative class may have a sufficient “identity of interest” with a similarly
situated individual to allow for relation back.217
Rather than examine identities of interest, a more precise inquiry for
determining involvement may be whether the original plaintiff had the
capacity to assert representative claims on behalf of the new plaintiff.218
213. But see Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 511 (D.D.C. 1990).
After holding that references to the existence of additional potential plaintiffs in the
complaint were not enough to permit relation back, the Page court allowed a limited class of
plaintiffs to relate back. Id. at 512-13. Because the defendant had engaged in “settlement
negotiations on a nationwide class basis,” the court determined the defendant had recognized
that the class plaintiffs were involved in the litigation. Id. at 513. Thus, the court granted
relation back to those members of the class for whom the statute of limitations had not yet
expired at the time of the settlement negotiations. Id. at 514. The plaintiff did not have the
capacity to assert claims on behalf of the class members at the time of the negotiations, as
the class had not yet been certified. See id. at 512-14. However, the court appears to have
reasoned that because the plaintiff could have gained that capacity through certification,
notice could be imputed to the defendant. See id. at 514.
214. See, e.g., Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 14-16 (1st Cir. 2002); Pappion v. Dow
Chem. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1576, 1581 (W.D. La. 1986).
215. See In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1391 (D. Alaska 1990) (noting that
although not required by the language of Rule 15(c), “a large number of the cases allowing
relation back under Rule 15(c) do involve legal or familial relationships”).
216. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
217. See Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008).
218. See supra notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, when the Williams court introduced the use of the “identity of
interest” test to determine whether notice of a plaintiff’s involvement was
met, the mother had the capacity to assert claims on her child’s behalf as
well as her own.219 Under this standard, relation back would also be
allowed when “the same natural person serves two fiduciary roles,” for
example, as both personal representative of a decedent’s estate and as
guardian ad litem of the surviving children.220 When the defendant has
notice that the original plaintiff had the capacity to sue on behalf of the
plaintiff to be brought in, and the claims of the new plaintiff are
transactionally related to the claims in the original complaint, the defendant
can be said to have notice not only of the existence of the new plaintiff’s
claims, but also of the actual involvement of the new plaintiff in the suit.
Involvement requires that the defendant had “adequate notice of the new
plaintiffs, and that the original suit in effect asserted their claims as
well.”221 When applied in this way, the involvement requirement functions
as an effective replacement for the “mistake of identity” requirement,
limiting relation back to those cases where the plaintiffs did not sit on their
rights, but had reason to believe those rights were being actively asserted,
either by themselves or by someone with the capacity to do so.
III. Tenth Circuit Jurisprudence
A. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
The standard for relation back of amendments adding plaintiffs is not
settled in the Tenth Circuit. In a recent case, McClelland v. Deluxe
Financial Services, Inc., the Tenth Circuit considered the question of
whether an amendment adding class allegations of discrimination would
relate back to an individual claim based on similar allegations.222 The court
refused to allow the claim to relate back, based on a determination not only
that the amendment sought to add new plaintiffs, but also that it included
“new and separate allegations implicating a wider set of facts, witnesses,
and proofs.”223 The court applied Rule 15(c)(1)(B) and concluded that the
“complaint [did] not arise out of the same ‘conduct, transaction, or

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1968).
Beal v. City of Seattle, 954 P.2d 237, 242 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 511 (D.D.C. 1990).
431 F. App’x 718, 729-30 (10th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 730.
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occurrence set out . . . in the initial pleading,’” and therefore did not relate
back.224
Because the plaintiff did not meet the threshold requirement of
transactional relatedness,225 it is unclear whether the court would have
applied some form of other requirements under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), or if the
court would have found transactional relatedness sufficient to allow relation
back, as the Seventh Circuit has done.
The court did briefly address the issue of repose, noting that while “a
potential defendant has a ‘strong interest in repose,’ repose should not be a
‘windfall’ for a defendant who possesses sufficient notice of impending
claims.”226 The court went on to focus on whether “sufficient notice” was
given.227 Thus, for amendments adding plaintiffs to relate back, the Tenth
Circuit appears to require (1) transactional relatedness, and (2) “sufficient
notice of impending claims.”228 Although McClelland provides some
guidance, it remains unclear in the Tenth Circuit what constitutes
“sufficient notice.” The court expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit’s
Paskuly position that an individual allegation of discrimination was
“sufficient in and of itself to provide notice” of class-wide discrimination
claims.229 However, it is unclear whether “sufficient notice” to protect a
defendant’s interests in repose requires mere notice that related claims by
additional plaintiffs were possible, as the Seventh Circuit requires, or notice
both of the existence and involvement of the new plaintiff, as Leachman
demands.
Because the court was not faced with determining the precise
requirements for relation back of amendments adding plaintiffs, the court
did not address whether any kind of limiting requirement, such as “identity
of interest,” should be imposed. However, because the court was silent on
the issue, requiring identity of interest would not be inconsistent with
McClelland. An identity of interest standard would promote the threshold
requirements of transactional relatedness and notice, while also addressing
the next step of the analysis.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 719 (second alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B)).
See id. at 730.
Id. at 723 (quoting Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010)).
Id. at 731-32.
See id. at 719, 723.
Id. at 732.
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B. District Court Opinions
The district courts within the Tenth Circuit have taken a variety of
approaches to allowing relation back for new plaintiffs. In American
Banker’s Insurance Co. v. Colorado Flying Academy, Inc., the District of
Colorado took an approach similar to that of the Seventh Circuit.230 First,
the court quoted Rule 15(c), including the mistake of identity
requirement.231 The court next quoted the 1966 Advisory Committee Note
providing that the attitude of the rule “extends by analogy to amendments
changing plaintiffs.”232 Then, the court simply stated that because the
allegations were “almost identical,” and because there was no apparent
prejudice to the defendant, the amendment related back.233 The court did
not undertake any analysis of the requirements listed in Rule 15(c); nor did
it give any justification for completely eliminating any form of the mistake
requirement. In so doing, the court reduced the nuanced requirements of
Rule 15(c) to a simple transactional test. Relying partially on American
Banker’s, the District of Kansas has also allowed relation back when claims
were transactionally related and no prejudice was found.234
The Northern District of Oklahoma used a similar test in United States ex
rel. Koch v. Koch Industries, Inc.235 In Koch, however, the court relied on a
Tenth Circuit case from 1951, American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. All
American Bus Lines, Inc.,236 to conclude that transactional relatedness
should be the only requirement.237 The court failed to note that at the time
American Fidelity was decided, the rules did not specifically provide for
changing parties at all, as the provision now known as Rule 15(c)(1)(C) was
not added until 1966.238 In American Fidelity, the court was tasked with
determining whether the real party in interest could be added to the action
once the statute of limitations had passed.239 Today, it is generally accepted
that an amendment adding the real party in interest automatically relates
230. See 93 F.R.D. 135, 136-37 (D. Colo. 1982).
231. See id. at 136.
232. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee’s note (1966)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
233. Id. at 136-37.
234. Ottawa Cnty. Lumber & Supply, Inc. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., No. 03-4187-RDR,
2004 WL 813768, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 17, 2004).
235. See No. 91-CV-763-B, 1995 WL 812134, at *8 (N.D. Okla. 1995).
236. 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1951).
237. Koch, 1995 WL 812134, at *8.
238. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (1938) (amended 1966).
239. Am. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 190 F.2d at 237.
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back under Rule 17.240 Therefore, although the analysis in American
Fidelity was correct, it is not analogous to the situation in Koch.
Furthermore, because Rule 15(c) did not expressly address adding or
changing parties in 1951, there was no “mistake of identity” requirement in
the rule at that time.241 However, the requirement was present in the rule at
the time Koch was decided,242 and the court should have addressed why it
chose to ignore that requirement.
In 1994, the District of Colorado again addressed relation back of
plaintiffs in Ambraziunas v. Bank of Boulder.243 In Ambraziunas, however,
the court applied the literal approach and refused to allow relation back
because, although the plaintiffs shared “commonality between their
claims,” they did not establish “any mistake in the original complaint to
merit the relation back of the claims.”244 Although the court’s approach in
this case was contrary to its earlier decision in American Banker’s, the court
did not refer to American Banker’s or any other Tenth Circuit court’s
decision.245
The Eastern District of Oklahoma, in Plummer v. Farmers Group, Inc.,
followed Olech in applying a prejudice-focused identity of interest test.246
In what appears to be the most extensive analysis of relation back taken by
any court in the Tenth Circuit, the Plummer court announced a four-factor
test including an identity of interest requirement, stating that the purpose of
the test is “to determine whether the Rule 15(c) requirements of fair notice
and lack of prejudice have been met.”247
Although the court used the term “identity of interest,” it placed
emphasis on notice, rather than actual involvement of the plaintiff, resulting
in an approach that more closely resembles the Seventh Circuit than

240. See, e.g., Scheufler v. Gen. Host Corp., 126 F.3d 1261, 1270-71 (10th Cir. 1997);
Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1997).
241. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (1938) (amended 1966).
242. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (1966) (amended 1991, 1993).
243. See 846 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Colo. 1994).
244. Id. at 1467.
245. The court cited only two sources: In re Integrated Res. Real Estate Ltd. P’ships Sec.
Litig., 815 F. Supp. 620, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), and 6A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1501, at 154 (1990). See Ambraziunas, 846 F. Supp. at 1467.
246. See 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315-16 (E.D. Okla. 2005). In Plummer, the court
addressed this issue not in the statute of limitations context, but to decide if an amendment
“related back” to before the Class Action Fairness Act went into effect. To decide this, the
court went through the Rule 15(c)(1)(C) analysis as if it applied. Id.
247. Id.
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Williams or other courts using an “existence and involvement” standard.248
While the court did use notice to limit the class of potential plaintiffs,
stating that “notice from the initial [individual] complaint . . . cannot serve
as ‘adequate’ notice of all claims on behalf of all plaintiffs who might
someday fall with in [sic] the class definition,”249 this approach still appears
to be much more liberal than the restrictive identity of interest test
articulated in Williams. Although the court refused to allow relation back
for plaintiffs who were all victims of the defendant’s alleged actions, it was
because the claimants had “separate contracts, for separate property, with
differing monetary value.”250 It is unclear to what extent the court would
allow untimely amendments for class action plaintiffs with identical claims.
Thus, it appears that the trend among the district courts in the Tenth
Circuit is an approach similar to that of the Seventh Circuit. Generally, the
courts require only transactional relatedness and a lack of prejudice.
However, with the exception of the Plummer court, none of these courts
appear to have closely examined the issue.
IV. The Effect of State Relation Back Law in Federal Court
In an interesting twist on this issue, federal courts may find themselves
applying state relation back law in the area where relation back is most
likely to cause extreme results: the class action context. Assume an
individual, not having federal jurisdiction for his claim, files a case in state
court. When the amendment is made to add class plaintiffs, the defendant
will likely immediately remove to federal court under the Class Action
Fairness Act.251 If the statute of limitations ran before the amendment was
filed, the federal court will apply state civil procedure statutes to determine
if the amendment (which was made in state court) will relate back.252
Many state rules of civil procedure mirror the federal rules, and therefore
states often look to the federal courts for guidance on how to apply these
rules.253 Thus, much of the relevant state law has been influenced by the
248. See id.
249. Id. at 1316 (alterations in original) (quoting Heaphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., No. C05 5404RBL, 2005 WL 1950244, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
250. Id.
251. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2012).
252. See, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Sav-a-Lot of Winchester, 291 F.3d 392, 395 (6th
Cir. 2002).
253. See Ex parte Novus Utils., Inc., 85 So. 3d 988, 996 (Ala. 2011) (“We note that
federal decisions construing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive authority in
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approaches taken among federal courts.254 A state court, however, is not
bound by the federal courts in a particular circuit.255 Furthermore, some
state civil procedure statutes differ significantly from the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.256 In Florida, for example, the state civil procedure statute
does not specifically allow for relation back when adding new parties.257
Therefore, the general rule in Florida state court is that relation back is not
allowed when adding new parties.258 However, the Florida courts have
constructively allowed such amendments to relate back when sufficient
“identity of interest” is shown.259 As a result, it is possible that a federal
court in the Eleventh Circuit—which normally applies a literal, mistake of
identity approach—might find itself bound to apply an “identity of interest”
approach when applying Florida state relation back law. Likewise, some
courts in the Eleventh Circuit might be bound by Alabama law, which deals
with relation back of plaintiffs exclusively under the state’s version of Rule
17, which is treated as a “companion rule” to Rule 15260 and thus requires
construing the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure because the Alabama Rules were patterned
after the Federal Rules.”); Luckett v. Bodner, 2009 WI 68, ¶ 29, 318 Wis. 2d 423, 769
N.W.2d 504 (“When ‘a state rule mirrors the federal rule, we consider federal cases
interpreting the rule to be persuasive authority.’” (quoting Wisconsin v. Evans, 2000 WI
App 178, ¶ 8 n.2, 238 Wis. 2d 411, 617 N.W.2d 220)).
254. See, e.g., R.A. Jones & Sons, Inc. v. Holdman, 470 So. 2d 60, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (citing Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1968), when applying
the state relation back rule); Kest v. Hanna Ranch, Inc., 785 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Haw. Ct. App.
1990) (“[W]e will consider pertinent federal decisions interpreting FRCP Rule 15(c), since
they are deemed ‘to be highly persuasive’ in the construction of our Rule 15(c).” (quoting
Ellis v. Crockett, 451 P.2d 814, 824 (Haw. 1969))); Perrin v. Stensland, 240 P.3d 1189, 1193
(Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (applying the United States Supreme Court’s construction of FED. R.
CIV. P. 15(c) to the state’s corresponding relation back rule).
255. Beal ex rel. Martinez v. City of Seattle, 954 P.2d 237, 240-41 (Wash. 1998).
256. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.190(c).
257. See id.
258. Schwartz ex rel. Schwartz v. Wilt Chamberlain’s of Boca Raton, Ltd., 725 So. 2d
451, 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
259. See, e.g., Ron’s Quality Towing, Inc. v. Se. Bank of Fla., 765 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam); R.A. Jones & Sons, Inc., 470 So.2d at 68; Schachner v.
Sandler, 616 So. 2d 166, 167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
260. The Advisory Committee Notes to Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) state:
This subdivision specifically provides that substitution of plaintiffs in order to
bring the real party in interest before the court shall have the same effect had
the action been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. This, in
effect, makes the doctrine in relation back of amendments changing parties
applicable to plaintiffs and is the companion to similar treatment for defendants
found in Rule 15.
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that the defendant “knew or should have known that, but for a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party, the substituted or joined party
would have brought the action against him.”261 Regardless of how liberally
or narrowly a particular federal jurisdiction allows relation back under Rule
15(c), the prevailing interpretation of the state law must control in these
cases.262
V. Implications in the Class Action Context
Relation back of plaintiffs can have particularly significant implications
in the class action context. For example, in Page, the plaintiff originally
filed an individual action.263 The “nationwide class of indeterminate size”
she sought to add after the limitations period expired would have included
“all persons whose benefits had not vested under the terms of a retirement
plan in violation of ERISA’s strict vesting requirements, and for whom [the
defendant] nevertheless [had] refused to guarantee benefit payments.”264
Although increased liability alone is not considered sufficient prejudice to
deny relation back,265 such a massive change in the scope of the litigation
also “make[s] a mockery of . . . repose.”266 Thus, to respect the statute of
limitations, it appears that allowing relation back of class actions should
only be allowed in exceptional cases.
An additional consideration is a principle the Supreme Court put forth in
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah.267 In that case, the Court noted
that for tolling purposes, policies underlying the statute of limitations are
satisfied when the initiation of a class action “notifies . . . defendants not
only of the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the
number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate
ALA. R. CIV. P. 17 advisory committee’s note (1973); see also Blue Star Ready Mix v.
Cleveland ex rel. Cleveland, 473 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1985).
261. Blue Star Ready Mix, 473 So. 2d at 499 (emphasis added).
262. See Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Sav-a-Lot of Winchester, 291 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir.
2002) (holding that where the amendments are filed prior to removal to federal court, state
civil procedure rules, rather than the federal rules, apply); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)
(“These rules apply to civil actions removed to the United States district courts from the
state courts and govern procedure after removal.” (emphasis added)).
263. Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 511 (D.D.C. 1990).
264. Id.
265. In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1391 (D. Alaska 1990).
266. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Page, 130 F.R.D. at
513 (“Such a principle would effectively nullify the statute of limitations and its assurance of
some repose to a defendant.”).
267. 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974).
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in the judgment.”268 Later, in Perry v. Beneficial Finance Co. of N.Y., the
Western District of New York relied on this rationale to limit a proposed
class to those members for whom the statute of limitations had not yet
expired.269 The court reasoned that because the original single-plaintiff
action did not apprise the defendant of the size and generic identities of the
proposed class members, any claims barred by the statute of limitations
would not relate back.270
Thus, under Perry, no amendments adding class plaintiffs would likely
ever be allowed to relate back to a lawsuit filed as a single-plaintiff action.
Conversely, under the Seventh Circuit’s transactional approach, virtually
any individual action could be amended to include class claims after the
limitations period has expired. Finally, courts applying the Williams
standard requiring notice of the existence and involvement of the new
plaintiff may or may not find that such an amendment should relate back.
The majority of courts applying the Williams standard are in agreement that
an individual complaint does not ordinarily provide adequate notice of the
claims of potential class members.271 Class claims, if permitted to relate
back at all, are restricted to those cases where, as in Sokolski, the original
complaint makes specific references to “new plaintiffs,”272 or where, as in
Page, a plaintiff in an individual action purported to assert claims on behalf
of a proposed class in settlement negotiations.273 However, even where a
plaintiff asserts class-wide demands in settlement negotiations, if the class
has not yet been certified, the plaintiff does not have the legal capacity to
assert claims on behalf of the other class members; and absent that
authority, a defendant might not have reason to believe that the new
plaintiffs’ claims were actually being asserted in the original complaint.
VI. Courts Should Apply a Narrow Involvement Approach
Courts should allow relation back of amendments adding plaintiffs only
when defendants had notice of the existence and involvement of the new
plaintiffs, as articulated in Williams. This approach allows relation back
when the new claim is transactionally related to the original claim and the
defendant had notice of both the existence and involvement of the new
268. Id. at 555.
269. 81 F.R.D. 490, 495 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
270. Id.; see also Clif J. Shapiro, Note, Amendments That Add Plaintiffs Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 671, 685 (1982).
271. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
272. Sokolski v. Trans Union Corp., 178 F.R.D. 393, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
273. Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 513 (D.D.C. 1990).
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plaintiff within the notice period set out in Rule 15(c)(1)(C). The
involvement approach furthers the policy of adjudicating claims on the
merits while upholding the policies behind statutes of limitations.274 This
approach is more practical than applying “mistake of identity” to plaintiffs,
but serves the same limiting function. A more liberal approach, allowing
relation back of all amendments adding new parties as long as they assert
transactionally-related claims, would enlarge substantive rights and
possibly render Rule 15(c) invalid under the Rules Enabling Act.275
Furthermore, such an approach “would undermine applicable statutes of
limitations and make a mockery of the promise of repose.”276
A. The Standard for Finding Involvement
To effectively uphold the policies behind the statute of limitations, the
standard for finding involvement must be restrictively applied. As a
threshold requirement, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the amendment
asserts a claim arising out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out,
or attempted to be set out, in the original complaint. Then, the court must
consider whether the defendant had notice that the plaintiff to be brought in
by amendment asserted or attempted to assert a claim in court during the
limitations period.
First, the original plaintiff must have had the capacity to assert claims on
behalf of the new plaintiff.277 Second, circumstances must also indicate that
the plaintiff was asserting those representative claims. Thus, demands made
on behalf of the new party in settlement negotiations would provide notice
sufficient to allow relation back, but only if an existing plaintiff had a right
to assert those demands on the new plaintiff’s behalf.278 Likewise, explicit
references to “new plaintiffs” in the original complaint could indicate to the
defendant that another party was involved, but only if the existing plaintiff
had the right to assert those claims on behalf of those plaintiffs. Settlement
negotiations by an individual on behalf of a proposed class do not provide

274. Dismissal of an untimely claim is considered a decision on the merits, not a mere
technicality. United States v. Or. Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1922) (stating that a
limitations defense is “substantial and meritorious” and noting that “[s]tatutes of limitation
are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law”).
275. See infra Part IV.D.
276. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2002).
277. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 203-13, 273 (discussing whether assertion of
class-wide demands in settlement negotiations indicates “involvement” of the putative
class).
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sufficient notice to allow relation back if the individual has not yet been
certified to represent the class members.
B. The Involvement Approach Addresses the Policies Underlying Statutes of
Limitations
As the Advisory Committee Note makes clear, the primary policy
concern when dealing with relation back is the statute of limitations.279 The
involvement approach has the advantage of imposing requirements that
speak to the policies behind statutes of limitations. This approach implicitly
addresses the statute of limitations by requiring that “the defendant must
have had, within the applicable limitations period, adequate notice of the
new plaintiffs, and that the original suit in effect asserted their claims as
well.”280 First, this approach protects the defendant’s interest in repose by
limiting the number of potential new plaintiffs to those who were
essentially embraced by the original claim. Thus, the involvement
requirement serves as an effective substitute for the mistake provision in
Rule 15(c). Both requirements uphold the statute of limitations policies by
limiting relation back to those cases where the plaintiff has attempted to
assert a claim during the statutory period, while screening out cases where
the plaintiff simply seeks to take advantage of relation back to circumvent
the statute of limitations. Without this limiting safeguard, potentially
unlimited numbers of additional plaintiffs “could cause defendants’ liability
to increase geometrically and their defensive strategy to become far more
complex long after the statute of limitations had run.”281 As the Leachman
court aptly pointed out: “At some point, defendants should have notice of
who their adversaries are.”282 This is particularly obvious in the class action
context, when a small individual action could become a nationwide class
action suit long after the statute of limitations has expired. Furthermore, by
imposing a notice requirement, this approach prevents prejudice to the
defendant by ensuring that the defendant was aware of the plaintiff’s
involvement before the limitations period had passed.
C. The Absence of Prejudice Alone is Not an Effective Test
Courts espousing a liberal standard for relation back of amendments
adding plaintiffs argue that claims arising from the same transaction or
occurrence should relate back simply because they provide notice, and that
279.
280.
281.
282.

FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee’s note (1966).
Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 130 F.R.D. 510, 511 (D.D.C. 1990).
Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Id.
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this notice ensures the defendant will not be prejudiced.283 However, this
argument fails because while an initial suit might place the defendant on
notice of the existence of other potential plaintiffs, it does not give notice
that these other potential plaintiffs are involved in the case or that they plan
to become involved.284 As the First Circuit pointed out in Young v. Lepone,
“[S]uch minimal notice hardly suffices to avert undue prejudice” to the
defendant.285 Even where the claims are identical, the addition of new
plaintiffs may “entail new legal theories and tactics against which [the
defendant] must defend.”286
Furthermore, notice merely for the sake of preventing prejudice does not
go far enough in addressing the underlying policies behind the statute of
limitations. First, even if no specific prejudice is shown, an untimely claim
violates the defendant’s interest in repose.287 Moreover, as the Williams
court pointed out, when belatedly introducing a new party, “something else
is added” to the usual notice requirement.288 That “something else” is
encompassed in the “mistake of identity” requirement of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)
by limiting amendments adding defendants to those defendants the plaintiff
tried to bring in during the limitations period, but was not able to because of
a mistake. To satisfy the policies behind the statute of limitations, it is
necessary to limit new plaintiffs by excluding those whose untimeliness is
due to inexcusable negligence, and to include only those who were in fact
involved in the litigation from the beginning. Requiring only a showing of
notice allows plaintiffs to contravene the statute of limitations by taking
advantage of the diligence of others.
D. Rules Enabling Act and Erie Doctrine Considerations
Recognizing the substantive policy behind statutes of limitations, some
courts have been wary of expanding a plaintiff’s right to bring a lawsuit.289
Because substantive rights may not be enlarged or modified by procedural

283. See Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). See generally Shapiro,
supra note 270.
284. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2002).
285. Id. at 17.
286. Id.
287. Leachman, 694 F.2d at 1309.
288. Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1968).
289. See, e.g., Brever v. Federated Equity Mgmt. Co., 233 F.R.D. 429, 435 (W.D. Pa.
2005).
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rule,290 interpreting the rule in a way that does so would “run afoul of the
Rules Enabling Act.”291
Likewise, a restrictive approach may be necessary under the theory that
relation back of plaintiffs is not covered by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure at all. The Advisory Committee’s Notes only suggest that “the
attitude taken . . . extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs”
as well.292 Thus, it is possible that the committee merely invites courts to
deal with this issue themselves. If so, an expansive judicially-created
relation back doctrine in conflict with substantive state limitations statutes
could violate the Erie Doctrine, as it would result in “an ‘inequitable
administration’ of the law.”293 Some courts have recognized this as a
constraint on their ability to allow relation back liberally.294 It is for this
reason that some literal-interpretation courts adhere to the text of Rule
15(c).295 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the limitation in Asher v. Unarco
Material Handling, Inc., observing that “[i]f the drafters of Rule 15(c) had
intended to permit relation back on these facts, the rule would have so
stated. Similarly, had the [state] legislature wanted the claims of untimely
plaintiffs to escape the time bar . . . it would have spoken.”296
Conclusion
In keeping with the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
courts are instructed to allow amendments liberally in order to promote the
adjudication of conflicts on the merits. It does not follow, however, that this
policy should also require amendments to relate back liberally. Dismissal
because a claim is time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations is a
290. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 556 n.26 (1974) (“The Enabling
Act empowering the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure commands that ‘[s]uch
rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right . . . .’” (alterations in
original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072)).
291. Brever, 233 F.R.D. at 435; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012); Yorden v. Flaste, 374
F. Supp. 516, 520 n.17 (D. Del. 1974) (“The potential conflict between this Federal Rule and
the state statute of limitations may raise an Erie problem.”).
292. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(C) advisory committee’s note (1966).
293. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980) (quoting Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)); see also id. at 747 (“[T]he ‘outcome-determination’ test
of Erie and York [must] be read with reference to the ‘twin aims’ of Erie: ‘discouragement
of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.’” (quoting
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468)).
294. See Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d 313, 320 (6th Cir. 2010).
295. See id.
296. Id.
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substantive and meritorious defense, and defendants should be deprived of
the protections of the statute of limitations only when the underlying
policies behind the statute have been upheld. A relation back rule requiring
that defendants have notice that the new plaintiff attempted to assert a claim
in court during the limitations period will enable plaintiffs to bring
meritorious claims while ensuring “essential fairness” to the defendant by
upholding the policies underlying the statute of limitations.
Michelle L. Nabors

